The Capacity of Multi-round Private Information Retrieval from Byzantine
  Databases by Yao, Xinyu et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
06
90
7v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  2
1 J
an
 20
19
The Capacity of Multi-round Private Information
Retrieval from Byzantine Databases
Xinyu Yao∗, Nan Liu†, Wei Kang∗
∗School of Information Science and Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing, China, {xyyao,wkang}@seu.edu.cn
†National Mobile Communications Research Laboratory, Southeast University, China, nanliu@seu.edu.cn
Abstract—In this work, we investigate the capacity of private
information retrieval (PIR) from N replicated databases, where
a subset of the databases are untrustworthy (byzantine) in their
answers to the query of the user. We allow for multi-round
queries and demonstrate that the identities of the byzantine
databases can be determined with a small additional download
cost. As a result, the capacity of the multi-round PIR with
byzantine databases (BPIR) reaches that of the robust PIR
problem when the number of byzantine databases is less than
the number of trustworthy databases.
Index Terms—private information retrieval, byzantine
database, capacity, multi-round, MDS code
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of preserving the identity of the data the user
retrieved from the databases is called the private information
retrieval (PIR) problem, the concept of which was introduced
by Chor et. al. [1]. In the PIR problem in [1], the user wants
to retrieve a certain bit from N replicated databases without
revealing which bit is of interest to any single database.
The main objective is to optimize the communication effi-
ciency, which includes minimizing the upload cost and the
download cost. The problem was reformulated in [2] from
an information-theoretic perspective, where the user wants to
retrieve a sufficiently large message from the database so that
the download cost is minimized. This problem was fully solved
by Sun and Jafar in [2], where the capacity of the PIR problem
was shown to be
CPIR =
1− 1
N
1− ( 1
N
)K
, (1)
which is defined as the ratio of the desired message size and
the total number of downloaded symbols from the databases.
The capacity increases with the number of databases N , since
with the help of more databases, we can hide the privacy of
the user better from any single database.
Many interesting extensions and variations for the PIR
problem have since then been studied [3]–[34]. While most
works are based on the assumption that the databases provide
the user with the correct answers to the user’s query, some
consider the case where not all of the databases are compliant,
and furthermore, the set of databases that are not compliant is
not known to the user when sending its query. The first set of
problems in this category is the robust PIR (RPIR) problem
[35], where a subset of databases with size B are silent and
do not respond to the queries. This may be due to the fact
that these databases intentionally do not respond or are slow
in responding [36], [37]. The goal of the user is to design its
query such that the download cost is minimized, the privacy
of the user is preserved, and most importantly, the desired
message can be correctly decoded based only on the answers
of those databases that do respond in a timely fashion. The
capacity of the RPIR problem is [35]
CRPIR =


1− 1
N−B
1−( 1
N−B
)K
if B < N − 1
K−1 if B = N − 1
0 if B = N
. (2)
Comparing (2) with (1), we see that the capacity of the RPIR
is as if the number of databases is reduced from N to N −B,
i.e., the effective number of databases is N − B. Variants of
the RPIR problem has been studied for coded databases [36],
[38], and universal scenarios [37].
The second set of problems in this category is the PIR
problem from byzantine databases (BPIR). The information-
theoretic formulation of the BPIR problem was proposed in
[39], where a subset of databases with size B may introduce
arbitrary errors to the answers of the user’s query. This may
be done unintentionally, for example, when some databases’
contents are not up to date [40], or intentionally, when some
databases introduce errors in their answers to prevent the
user from correctly decoding the desired message. While the
user knows the number B, it does not know which set of
B databases are byzantine. The goal of the user is to design
queries such that the download cost is minimized, the privacy
of the user is preserved, and most importantly, the user can
decode the desired message correctly despite the arbitrary
wrong answers from the byzantine databases. The capacity
of the BPIR problem was found in [39] and is given by
CBPIR =


N−2B
N
1− 1
N−2B
1−( 1
N−2B )
K if 2B + 1 < N
(NK)−1 if 2B + 1 = N
0 if 2B + 1 > N
. (3)
Comparing (3) with (1) and (2), we see that, the number of
effective databases is N−2B, i.e., even though there are only
B byzantine databases, it is as if 2B databases are offering
no information to the user. Note that the penalty term N−2B
N
comes from the fact that all N databases send answers, though
only the answers from N−2B databases are useful. We do not
have the penalty term of N−B
N
in the RPIR problem because
the silent databases do not send any data. Variantions of the
BPIR problem, which include collusion and coded storage
have been studied in [38], [41].
There is a connection between the RPIR problem and the
BPIR problem, in that if the user knows the identity of the B
databases who do not respond truthfully, the user can simply
ignore the answers from these databases and the problem
becomes the RPIR problem. Thus, if the user can be given
“some help” in identifying the set of byzantine databases, the
number of effective databases would increase from N−2B to
N −B. This help does not need to be much, compared to the
download cost, as there are only
(
N
B
)
possibilities for the set of
byzantine databases, while the download cost of a sufficiently
large message scales linearly with the message length.
Based on this idea, [42] formulated a variant of the BPIR
problem where the databases offer this “little help” to the user.
More specifically, in their problem formulation, the databases
are all trustworthy, and there is a byzantine third party, who
can listen in on the communication between E databases and
the user, and has the ability to arbitrarily change the answers
of B databases. In this case, as long as the databases can hide
some transmitted information to the user from the adversary
and ǫ-error is allowed [42], the byzantine databases may be
identified and the capacity of the BPIR problem reaches that
of the RPIR problem, i.e., the number of effective databases
is N −B, rather than N − 2B.
In this paper, we follow the problem formulation of [39],
i.e., a subset of the databases are byzantine and not a third
party, and explore how the user may identify the byzantine
databases on its own. We remove the assumption of single-
round communication between the user and the databases
in [39], and allow for multi-rounds of queries in the sense
that the current round of queries can depend on the answers
from the databases in the previous rounds. In the proposed
achievability scheme, while the first round deals with the
basic file transmission, further rounds are aimed at finding the
identities of the byzantine databases. At least one byzantine
database will be caught in each round, so at most B + 1
rounds are needed. We find the capacity of the multi-round
BPIR problem and show that by allowing multi-rounds, we
can indeed increase the effective number of databases from
N − 2B to N − B, and thus, decrease the download cost
significantly. This is in contrast with the classic PIR problem,
where multi-rounds does not increase the capacity [43].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the problem where K messages are stored
on N replicated databases. The K messages, denoted as
W1,W2, · · · ,WK , are independent and each message con-
sists of L symbols, which are independently and uniformly
distributed over a finite field Fq , where q is the size of the
field, i.e.,
H(Wk) = L, k = 1, ...,K,
H(W1, ...,WK) = H(W1) +H(W2) + · · ·+H(WK).
A user wants to retrieve the desired message Wθ , θ ∈ [K],
by sending designed queries to the databases. Unlike in most
of the previous PIR literature, where the queries are designed
and fixed prior to receiving any answers from the databases,
here we consider the scenario where the queries are allowed
to be multi-round, which means that the user can design the
queries based on the databases’ responses in the previous
rounds.
More specifically, in the case where Wθ is the interested
message, the query sent to the n-th databese in Round m is
denoted as Q
[θ]
n,m, n ∈ [N ], θ ∈ [K] andm ∈ [M ], whereM is
the total number of rounds. Since the queries may only depend
on the answers from the databases in the previous rounds, we
have
I(W1:K ;Q
[θ]
1:N,m|A
[θ]
1:N,1:m−1) = 0, ∀θ ∈ [K],m ∈ [M ].
Database n in Round m, upon receiving the query Q
[θ]
n,m,
calculates the correct answer, denoted as A¯
[θ]
n,m, based on the
queries received in this round Q
[θ]
n,m and the messages W1:K .
Thus, we have
H(A¯[θ]n,m|Q
[θ]
n,m,W1:K) = 0, ∀n ∈ [N ],m ∈ [M ], θ ∈ [K].
In the BPIR setting considered in this paper, there exists a set
of byzantine databases B, where |B| = B, who are untrust-
worthy. The remaining databases in [N ] \ B are trustworthy.
Hence, the trustworthy databases will transmit to the user the
correct answer A
[θ]
n,m = A¯
[θ]
n,m, for n ∈ [N ] \ B, while the
byzantine databases will replace the correct answer A¯
[θ]
n,m with
an arbitrary deterministic sequence a˜
[θ]
n,m of the same size, and
send it back to the user, i.e., A
[θ]
n,m = a˜
[θ]
n,m, n ∈ B.
The queries need to be designed such that the user is able to
reconstruct the desired message Wθ after M rounds no matter
what arbitrary answers the byzantine databases provide, i.e.,
for any a˜
[θ]
B,1:M , we have
H(Wθ|A
[θ]
1:N,1:M , Q
[θ]
1:N,1:M) = 0, ∀θ ∈ [K].
To protect the privacy of the user, we require that ∀n ∈ [N ],
we have
(Q
[1]
n,1:M ,W1:K) ∼ (Q
[θ]
n,1:M ,W1:K), ∀θ ∈ [K].
The rate of the BPIR problem, denoted as R, is defined as
the ratio between the message size L and the total downloaded
information from the databases in the worst case, i.e.,
R = lim
L→∞
max
a˜
[θ]
B,1:M
L∑N
n=1
∑M
m=1H(A¯
[θ]
n,m)
.
The capacity of the BPIR problem is CmultiBPIR = supR over
all possible retrieval schemes.
Remark: Since the databases can respond arbitrarily, it does
not matter whether the databases in B coordinate or not in
responding to the user.
III. MAIN RESULT
The main result of the paper is establishing the capacity of
the multi-round BPIR problem. This is given in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. The capacity of the multi-round BPIR problem is
CmultiBPIR =
{
N−B
N
1− 1
N−B
1−( 1
N−B
)K
, if 2B + 1 ≤ N
0, if 2B + 1 > N
. (4)
Comparing (4) with the capacity result for the RPIR prob-
lem, i.e., (2), and that of the single-round BPIR problem, i.e.,
(3), we see that
1) When 2B+1 < N , by allowing multi-round, the number
of effective databases has increased from N −2B, which
is the case for single-round BPIR, to N−B, which is the
same as the RPIR problem. An example of the normalized
download cost reduction is shown in Fig. 1 (a), where the
normalized download cost is defined as the inverse of the
capacity of the PIR problem.
2) When 2B + 1 = N , by allowing multi-round, the
download cost is significantly reduced since in a single-
round BPIR, the only possible scheme was to download
all the messages from all the databases. An example of
the normalized download cost reduction is shown in Fig.
1 (b).
3) When 2B + 1 > N , allowing multi-round does not
help, as the majority of the databases are untrustworthy
and there are error instances introduced by the byzan-
tine databases where correct decoding at the user is
impossible. Note that under the problem formulation
of [42], where the databases are all trustworthy and a
third-party is performing the byzantine attack, even when
2B+1 > N , the user can still correctly decode the desired
message with the databases’ help, which is hidden from
the byzantine third-party.
The achievability proof of Theorem 1 is given in the next
section, where the B byzantine databases are identified by the
multi-round queries. The converse proof, which is more trivial,
is presented in Section V.
IV. ACHIEVABILITY
We will first provide the main idea of the achievability
scheme. The proposed scheme is performed in several rounds.
In the first round, the message is cut into blocks, and for
each block we use the query structure of the RPIR scheme
[35]. While the answers in this round contain arbitrary errors
introduced by the byzantine databases, due to the error detect-
ing capability of linear block codes, the user is able to detect
the set of blocks that contain errors, which we call the error
blocks. In the following rounds, say Roundm,m ≥ 2, the user
re-request one error block using an MDS code whose rate is
small enough for the errors in the answers of Round m to be
corrected. By comparing the corrected data received in Round
m to the answers of this error block in Round 1, at least one of
the byzantine databases will be identified. After at most B+1
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Fig. 1. Download cost comparison of single-round vs. multi-round BPIR.
rounds, the user can identify all of the byzantine databases that
introduced errors in Round 1. Ignoring the answers from these
byzantine databases, the user can decode the desired message
correctly. Since the message length is sufficiently long, which
means that the number of blocks is sufficiently large, the extra
download cost in the rounds after Round 1 is negligible.
The details of the proposed achievability scheme is below.
We first start with some preliminaries.
A. Some Preliminaries
We first recall the error-detection and error-correction capa-
bilities of linear block codes.
Lemma 1. (Code Capability [44]) Let C be an [n, k, d] linear
block code over Fq. Then the code is able to detect up to (d−1)
errors and correct up to ⌊d−12 ⌋ errors.
Next, recall the definition of the MDS (maximum distance
separable) code [45]. A linear code with parameters [n, k, d]
such that k+d = n+1 is called an MDS code. The existence
of the MDS code is given by [46], which states that if the
field size q is large enough, then there exists an [n, k]q MDS
code for any k < n.
Lemma 2. (Punctrued MDS Code [47]) Let C be an (n,k)
MDS code, then deleting any p < n − k symbols from the
codeword yields a punctured code, which is also an MDS code.
Before presenting the detailed achievability scheme, We first
provide a motivating example.
B. Example: N = 6,K = 2, B = 2.
Consider the case of retrieving with privacy one of two
messages from six databases. Two of the six databases are
byzantine. The message length is L = (N − B)K l = 16l.
Each message is cut into l blocks. Let xj1,i and x
j
2,i denote
the i-th symbol in block j ofW1 andW2, respectively. Assume
without loss of generality that W1 is the desired message.
Transmission in Round 1: in Round 1, the user constructs
the queries in the same way for each block. For block j, the
query to retrieve the 16 symbols xj1,[1:16] is constructed in the
following way. Collect the 16 symbols into a column vector
x
j
1 =
[
xj1,1 x
j
1,2 · · · x
j
1,16
]T
. Let S1, S2 ∈ F
16×16
q be
random matrices chosen privately by the user, independently
and uniformly from all 16 × 16 full-rank matrices over Fq.
For the desired message W1, S1 is used to create 16 linear
combinations of xj1,[1:16]. Then these 16 mixed symbols are
further mapped into 24 symbols aj[1:24] using a (24,16)-MDS
code, i.e.,
aj[1:24] , MDS24×16S1x
j
1. (5)
For the undesired message W2, consider the first 4 rows of
the random matrix S2. The first 4 rows of S2 maps the 16
undesired symbols xj2,[1:16] into 4 linear combinations. They
are further mapped into 24 symbols, denoted as bj[1:24], with a
(24,4)-MDS code, i.e.
bj[1:24] , MDS24×4S2([1 : 4], :)x
j
2. (6)
We note here that the random matrices S1, S2 and the MDS
code is the same for each block.
As shown in Table I, the first stage of the query structure
is to retrieve single symbols. The second stage involves
using the undesired message as side information to receive 2-
sum symbols. Since there are two byzantine databases, three
independent undesired symbols from another three databases
can be utilized in the second stage for each database.
TABLE I
THE QUERY TABLE FOR BLOCK j IN ROUND 1 FOR THE CASE OF
N = 6, K = 2, B = 2
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB5 DB6
a
j
1
a
j
2
a
j
3
a
j
4
a
j
5
a
j
6
b
j
1
b
j
2
b
j
3
b
j
4
b
j
5
b
j
6
a
j
7
+ b
j
7
a
j
8
+ b
j
8
a
j
9
+ b
j
9
a
j
10
+ b
j
10
a
j
11
+ b
j
11
a
j
12
+ b
j
12
a
j
13
+ b
j
13
a
j
14
+ b
j
14
a
j
15
+ b
j
15
a
j
16
+ b
j
16
a
j
17
+ b
j
17
a
j
18
+ b
j
18
a
j
19
+ b
j
19
a
j
20
+ b
j
20
a
j
21
+ b
j
21
a
j
22
+ b
j
22
a
j
23
+ b
j
23
a
j
24
+ b
j
24
Round 1 ends when the answers for all l blocks are received
by the user.
Note that the scheme described above for each block is the
same as the query scheme of the RPIR problem for the entire
message [35]. Similar to the case of RPIR, the transmission
of Block j is private, and so is the transmission of the entire
Round 1.
Analyzing received data after Round 1: the user examines
the received data as follows. For Block j, the user first looks
at the retrieved single symbols of the undesired message, i.e.,
bj[1:6]. b
j
[1:6] is a (24,4)-MDS code with a sequence of length
p = 18 removed. Since the removed length p < 24 − 4,
according to Lemma 2, bj[1:6] is a (6, 4)-MDS code, which
can detect up to two errors, according to Lemma 1. Note that
the maximum number of errors the byzantine databases can
introduce in bj[1:6] is 2. Hence, if one or both of the byzantine
databases introduced an error in this stage, the user would
be able to detect it. If errors are detected in bj[1:6], Block j is
declared an error block of Round 1. Otherwise, S2([1 : 4], :)x
j
2
is correctly decoded.
If no error was found in bj[1:6], based on the four decoded
symbols S2([1 : 4], :)x
j
2, the user calculates b
j
7 to b
j
24 using
(6). bj7 to b
j
24 is then subtracted from the received 2-sum
symbols in Stage 2 and we are left with aj[7:24]. Since a
j
[1:24]
is a (24,16)-MDS code, and the number of errors the two
byzantine databases can introduce is less than 8, the user can
detect if any error is introduced by the byzantine databases in
aj[1:24], according to Lemma 1. If errors are detected, Block j
is declared an error block of Round 1.
We repeat the above procedure for each of the l blocks. At
the end of the procedure, denote the set of error blocks as E1.
We have one of the two following cases:
1) E1 = φ, i.e., no error was found on any of the blocks, which
means that the byzantine databases did not attack in Round 1.
In this case, no further rounds are needed. The user proceeds
to the final decoding step.
2) |E1| ≥ 1, which means that the byzantine databases attacked
in Round 1. In this case, further rounds are needed to correctly
decode the desired message.
Transmission in Round 2: the user uniformly picks one
block out of the |E1| blocks with detected error, say Block j1,
and perform the following encoding: map the 16 symbols of
Block j1 of each message into 48 symbols using a (48,16)-
MDS code,
cj1[1:48] , MDS48×16x
j1
1 ,
dj1[1:48] , MDS48×16x
j1
2 .
Ask the databases to transmit the symbols as shown in Table
II.
TABLE II
THE QUERY TABLE FOR BLOCK j IN ROUND 2 FOR THE CASE OF
N = 6,K = 2, B = 2
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB5 DB6
c
j1
1
,d
j1
1
c
j1
2
,d
j1
2
c
j1
3
,d
j1
3
c
j1
4
,d
j1
4
c
j1
5
,d
j1
5
c
j1
6
,d
j1
6
c
j1
7
,d
j1
7
c
j1
8
,d
j1
8
c
j1
9
,d
j1
9
c
j1
10
,d
j1
10
c
j1
11
,d
j1
11
c
j1
12
,d
j1
12
c
j1
13
, d
j1
13
c
j1
14
, d
j1
14
c
j1
15
, d
j1
15
c
j1
16
, d
j1
16
c
j1
17
, d
j1
17
c
j1
18
, d
j1
18
c
j1
19
, d
j1
19
c
j1
20
, d
j1
20
c
j1
21
, d
j1
21
c
j1
22
, d
j1
22
c
j1
23
, d
j1
23
c
j1
24
, d
j1
24
c
j1
25
, d
j1
25
c
j1
26
, d
j1
26
c
j1
27
, d
j1
27
c
j1
28
, d
j1
28
c
j1
29
, d
j1
29
c
j1
30
, d
j1
30
c
j1
31
, d
j1
31
c
j1
32
, d
j1
32
c
j1
33
, d
j1
33
c
j1
34
, d
j1
34
c
j1
35
, d
j1
35
c
j1
36
, d
j1
36
c
j1
37
, d
j1
37
c
j1
38
, d
j1
38
c
j1
39
, d
j1
39
c
j1
40
, d
j1
40
c
j1
41
, d
j1
41
c
j1
42
, d
j1
42
c
j1
43
, d
j1
43
c
j1
44
, d
j1
44
c
j1
45
, d
j1
45
c
j1
46
, d
j1
46
c
j1
47
, d
j1
47
c
j1
48
, d
j1
48
Analyzing received data after Round 2: the maximum
number of errors that can be introduced by the two byzantine
databases is 16 for cj1[1:48](d
j1
[1:48]). Since the (48, 16)-MDS
code can correct up to 16 errors according to Lemma 1,
irrespective of the errors the two byzantine databases introduce
in the answers of Round 2, upon receiving the transmission in
Table II, x
j1
1 and x
j1
2 can both be correctly decoded.
Now, the user calculates aj1[1:24] and b
j1
[1:24] according to
(5) and (6) using the correctly decoded xj11,[1:16] and x
j1
2,[1:16].
Then, the user compares the calculated correct values of aj1[1:24]
and bj1[1:24] with the answers for Block j1 received from the
six databases in Round 1, and the errors introduced by the
byzantine databases in Round 1 can be identified. We have
one of the following two cases:
1) Both byzantine databases introduced an error in Block j1.
In this case, the user can identifie both byzantine databases.
No further rounds are needed. The user proceeds to the final
decoding step.
2) Only one of the byzantine databases introduced an error
in Block j1. In this case, the user can identify one of the
byzantine databases, say Database y1. For all the blocks in E1,
i.e., the blocks detected with errors in Round 1, we ignore the
answer from the byzantine database identified, i.e., Database
y1, and detect whether there are still errors in the blocks
in E1. This detection procedure is the same as that after
Round 1, i.e., for each j ∈ E1, we first detect to see if the
bj[1:y1−1]
⋃
[y1+1:6]
still has errors. Since bj[1:y1−1]
⋃
[y1+1:6]
is
a (5,4)-MDS code, and at most 1 error is introduced by the
unidentified byzantine database, the error, if introduced, will
be detected. If an error is detected, we pronouce this block
an error block of Round 2. If bj[1:y1−1]
⋃
[y1+1:6]
has no errors,
the user correctly decodes S2([1 : 4], :)x
j
2, and proceeds to
calculate bj7 to b
j
24 using (6), which is then subtracted from the
received 2-sum symbols in Stage 2 of Round 1, after which we
are left with aj[7:24]. Since a
j
[1:24] ignoring the answer from the
identified byzantine database is a (20,16)-MDS code, and at
most 4 errors can be introduced by the unidentified byzantine
database, the introduced errors will be detected. If errors are
detected, Block j is an error block of Round 2. Denote the
set of error blocks, i.e., blocks where errors still exist after
the above detection procedure, as E2. We have one of the
following two cases:
1) E2 = φ, which means that the other byzantine database
never introduced any error in Round 1. In this case, no further
rounds are needed. The user proceeds to the final decoding
step.
2) |E2| ≥ 1, which means that the other uncaught byzantine
database introduced errors in the blocks belonging to E2. We
need Round 3 to catch the remaining uncaught byzantine
database.
Transmission in Round 3: uniformly and randomly pick
one of the blocks in E2, say Block j2. Repeat the query
procedure described in Round 2 for Block j1, replacing j1
with j2. Upon receiving the 96 answered symbols from the
databases in Round 3, we may again decode the corrected
symbols of x
j2
1 and x
j2
2 , due to the use of the (48,16)-MDS
code. By calculating aj2[1:24] and b
j2
[1:24] according to (5) and
(6) with the correctly decoded xj21,[1:16] and x
j2
2,[1:16], we may
compare the calculated correct values of aj2[1:24] and b
j2
[1:24] with
the corresponding Block j2 received from the six databases in
Round 1. This comparison will for sure reveal the identify of
the uncaught byzantine database as it had introduced at least
one error in this block. By now, the user has caught both
Byzantine databases. No further rounds are needed. The user
proceeds to the final decoding step.
Final Decoding: the user has identified all the byzantine
databases that introduced errors in Round 1, which we call
dishonest databases. We call the set of databases that did
not introduce any errors in Round 1 as honest databases.
The user examines the data received in Round 1, ignore the
answers from the dishonest databases and decode only from
the answers of the honest databases. Note that the number
of honest databases is no less than 4. More specifically, for
block j, j ∈ [l], looking at the received symbols of bj[1:6]
from the honest databases, the user can correctly decode
S2([1 : 4], :)x
j
2, based on the MDS property of the (24, 4)-
MDS code. Next, the user calculates bj7 to b
j
24 using (6).
Substract bj7 to b
j
24 from the received 2-sum symbols to obtain
aj[7:24]. Looking at the received symbols of a
j
[1:24] from the
honest databases, the user can correctly decode xj1,[1:16] based
on the MDS property of the (24, 16)-MDS code. This is
repeated for each block j, j ∈ [l] to correctly decode the
entire desired message.
Thus, for this example, we have proposed a query scheme
that allows the user to decode the desired message, irrespective
of the error pattern introduced by the byzantine databases. It
is easy to see that the scheme is private, not only in Round 1,
but in the entire query process, as in retransmitting, the user
uniformly and randomly picked a block with errors detected
and asked for the block of both messages, thus displaying no
preference over Message 1 or 2. Finally, the download cost is
30l if only 1 round is needed, 30l+96 if 2 rounds are needed
and 30l+192 if 3 rounds are needed, which is the worst case.
Thus, the BPIR achievable rate is
lim
l→∞
16l
30l+ 192
=
8
15
,
consistent with Theorem 1.
C. General Scheme
This scheme works when we have 2B + 1 ≤ N . Suppose
each message consists of L = (N − B)K · l symbols from
Fq, andWθ is the desired message. The user cuts the message
into l blocks and constructs the queries in the same way for
each block. Let the j-th block of Message k be denoted as a
vector x
j
k of length (N −B)
k, j ∈ [l], k ∈ [K].
Transmission in Round 1: We construct the queries of
each block using the achievable scheme of robust PIR for
the entire message [35, Section IV]. In [35], N out of M
databases respond and any T databases may collude. For our
problem, we use the query scheme of [35, Section IV] with
M replaced by N , N replaced by N − B and T = 1. More
specifically, the queries for each block involve (N − B)K
symbols from each message. For the desired message Wθ ,
use (N(N − B)K−1, (N − B)K)-MDS code to encode the
symbol mixtures randomized by an uniformly chosen matrix
Sθ from F
(N−B)K×(N−B)K
q . Consider the δ = 2K−1 subsets
of [K] that contain θ, each of which denoted as Li, i ∈ [δ].
Define the vector of symbol mixtures of the desired message
as 

ujθ,L1
ujθ,L2
...
ujθ,Lδ

 = MDSN(N−B)K−1×(N−B)KSθxjθ. (7)


uj
k,Kk1
uj
k,Kk1∪{θ}
uj
k,Kk2
uj
k,Kk2∪{θ}
...
uj
k,Kk
δ
uj
k,Kk
δ
∪{θ}


=


MDSNα1×α1 0 0 0
0 MDSNα2×α2 0 0
0 · · ·
. . . 0
0 0 0 MDSNα∆×α∆

Sk[(1 : (N −B)K−1), :]xjk (8)
For undesired messages x
j
k, k ∈ [K] \ {θ}, denote each of
the ∆ = 2K−2 subsets of [K] that contains k and not θ as
Kki , i ∈ [∆]. Define the vector of symbols mixtures of x
j
k, k ∈
[K] \ {θ}, as (8) shown on the top of the this page, where
αi = (N −B)(N −B−1)
|Ki|−1, each uj
k,Kk
i
is a N
N−Bαi×1
vector, and each uj
k,Kk
i
∪{θ}
is a
N(N−B−1)
N−B αi × 1 vector.
For each non-empty subset K ⊆ [K], generate the query
vectors as ∑
k∈K
ujk,K. (9)
Distribute the elements of the query vector evenly among the
N databases to complete the construction of the queries.
Analyzing received data after Round 1: After all l blocks
are received in Round 1, the user examines the data of each
block for error.
For Block j, the user first looks at the received undesired
symbols. For K ⊆ [K] that does not include θ,
∑
k∈K u
j
k,K
is an ( N
N−Bαi, αi)-MDS code, which can detect up to
B
N−Bαi errors, according to Lemma 1. Each database transmit
1
N
N
N−Bαi symbols, and as a result, the B byzantine databases
can make at most B
N
N
N−Bαi errors. Thus if any byzantine
databases introduced errors in the downloaded symbols of∑
k∈K u
j
k,K,K ⊆ [K], θ /∈ K, the user can detect them. If
errors are detected in the undesired symbols of Block j, we
say Block j is an error block of Round 1. Otherwise, the
interference terms in
∑
k∈K u
j
k,K, θ ∈ K can be correctly
calculated and subtracted.
If no error was found in the undesired symbols of Block
j, by subtracting the undesired symbol mixtures, the user can
obtain all the desired symbols mixtures, i.e., ujθ,K, for all K
that contain θ. Since an (N(N − B)K−1, (N − B)K)-MDS
code is used for the desired symbols according to (7), where
at most B(N −B)K−1 errors are introduced by the byzantine
databases, if any byzantine database introduced errors in the
desired symbol mixtures, the user can detect them. If errors
are detected in the desired symbol mixtures of Block j, we
say Block j is an error block of Round 1.
We repeat the above procedure for each of the l blocks.
At the end of the procedure, denote the set of error blocks
of Round 1 as E1. Depending on the actions of the byzantine
databases, we have one of the following two cases:
1) E1 = φ, which means that no error was introduced in Round
1 by the byzantine databases. In this case, no further rounds
are needed. The user proceeds to the final decoding step.
2) |E1| ≥ 1, which means that some byzantine databases
introduced errors in Round 1. In this case, further rounds are
performed according to the following iterative precedure. At
the end of Round m − 1, m ≥ 2, the user has found the
set of error blocks of Round m − 1, denoted as Em−1. At
the beginning of Round m, the user uniformly and randomly
picks one block, say jm−1, out of the |Em−1| error blocks and
constructs queries for Block jm−1 in Round m.
Transmission in Round m (m ≥ 2): the user downloads
the whole Block jm−1 of all K messages using an (Nα, (N−
B)K)-MDS code for each message, i.e.,
u
jm−1
k,[1:Nα] , MDSNα×(N−B)Kx
jm−1
k , ∀k ∈ [K]
where α ,
⌈
(N−B)K+1
N−2B
⌉
. By retrieving the whole block of
all messages, queries in Round m do not conflict with the
previous rounds in terms of privacy. The maximum number of
errors introduced by the byzantine databases is Bα for each
message, which is less than
⌊
d−1
2
⌋
, where the distance d of
the (Nα, (N − B)K)-MDS code is Nα − (N − B)K . Thus,
according to Lemma 1, irrespctive of the errors the byzantine
databases introduce in Round m for Block jm−1, the correct
symbols can be decoded by the user.
Analyzing received data after Round m: With the correct
symbols of Block jm−1 decoded, the user can calculate the
correct answers for Block jm−1 in Round 1 using (7), (8)
and (9), and compare it with the actual received symbols of
Block jm−1 in Round 1. Since Block jm−1 is an error block
of Round m− 1, it means that at least one of the unidentified
byzantine databases has made errors in Block jm−1 of Round
1. Hence, with the comparison, at least one of the byzantine
databases not caught in the previous rounds will be caught in
this round. Denote the number of byzantine databases caught
in Round m as nm.
The user finds the set of error blocks of Round m, i.e.,
Em, as follows: for each of the error blocks of Em−1, detect
if there are still errors after ignoring the answer from the
byzantine databases whose identity has been discoverd thus
far. This error detection can be done as we are looking at the
(
N−
∑
m
i=2 ni
N−B αi, αi)-MDS code for undesired symbols with at
most
B−
∑m
i=2 ni
N−B αi remaining errors, and ((N−
∑m
i=2 ni)(N−
B)K−1, (N−B)K)-MDS code for the desired symbols with at
most (B−
∑m
i=2 ni)(N−B)
K−1 remaining errors. According
to Lemma 1, these amounts of errors can be detected. Denote
the set of blocks where errors still exist as Em. We have one
of the following two cases:
1) Em = φ, which means that the user has found out the
identity of all byzantine databases that introduced errors in
Round 1. In this case, no further rounds are needed. The user
proceeds to the final decoding step.
2) |Em| ≥ 1, which means that there are still uncaught
byzantine databases who introduced errors in Round 1. In this
case, the user starts the query for Round m+ 1 by repeating
the above procedure.
Final Decoding: We have identified all the byzantine
databases that introduced errors in Round 1. The user decodes
by ignoring their answers. Since the query structure of Round
1 resembles that of the RPIR where N−B databases respond,
we can correctly decode the desired message ignoring the
answers from the byzantine databases.
Now we calculate the achievable rate. The downloaded sym-
bols for each block in Round 1 isN ·
∑K
k=1(N−B−1)
k−1
(
K
k
)
,
according to the RPIR problem [35, Section IV]. Starting from
Round m, m ≥ 2, KNα symbols are downloaded in each
round. In the worst case, the user needs B rounds to catch all
the B byzantine databases. Hence, the achievable rate of the
multi-round BPIR scheme proposed is
R = lim
l→∞
(N −B)K l
N
∑K
k=1(N −B − 1)
k−1
(
K
k
)
l +KNαB
=
(N −B)K
N
∑K
k=1(N −B − 1)
k−1
(
K
k
) (10)
=
N − B
N
·
1− 1
N−B
1− ( 1
N−B )
K
,
where (10) follows from the fact that α is a constant that does
not scale with l, i.e., from Round 2 to Round B (worst case),
only one block of message is requested each round, and these
download cost is negligible when the number of blocks go to
infinity.
V. CONVERSE
First, we focus on the case where 2B + 1 ≤ N . Consider
the problem where a genie tells the user the identity of the B
byzantine databases. The PIR capacity of this genie-aided case
is no less than the BPIR capacity of the problem considered
in Section II. Thus, the PIR capacity of the genie-aided case
provides an upper bound on the capacity of the multi-round
BPIR problem of interest.
In the genie-aided scenario, due to the fact that the byzantine
databases may change their answers arbitrarily, it is optimal
to simply ignore the answers from the B byzantine databases.
This turns the problem into the classic PIR problem studied in
[2] for N−B databases and K messages. [43] shows that for a
classic PIR problem, compared to single-round PIR schemes,
multi-round PIR scheme does not offer any performance gain
in terms of the PIR capacity. Hence, the PIR capacity of the
classic problem is
1− 1
N−B
1−( 1
N−B
)K
. By multiplying the penalty term
N−B
N
since all databases respond in the BPIR problem, we
obtain an upper bound for the multi-round BPIR problem of
interest.
Now we focus on the case where N < 2B+1 and B ≤ N .
We argue that in this case, the capacity of the BPIR problem is
zero. Define the actionA of a byzantine database to be: change
the realization of each of the K messages to a fake realization.
We see that no matter how the user design its query, it can
not distinguish between the following two cases:
1) All B byzantine databases perform action A and answer
the queries with the fake realization.
2) Only N − B byzantine databases perform action A and
answer the queries with the fake realization.
In both cases, the user sees B databases sending one realiza-
tion of the messages and N − B databases sending another
realization of the messages. It is impossible for the user to tell
which realization is the true one.
Thus, the capacity of the BPIR problem when 2B+1 > N
is zero. Intuitively speaking, this is the case where the number
of byzantine databases is no smaller than the trustworthy
databases, and hence the truth can be manipulated.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine the connection between the RPIR
and BPIR problem, and obtain the capacity of the multi-round
BPIR problem. We show that with multi-round queries, the
identities of the byzantine databases may be determined by the
user, and as a result, the capacity of the BPIR problem is equal
to that of the RPIR problem when the number of byzantine
databases is less than half of the total number of databases.
Thus, in face of byzantine databases, a multi-round query
structure can indeed decrease the download cost significantly,
compared to single-round queries.
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